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TORTS - NEGLIGENCE - LIABILITY OF MANUFACTURER TO REMO';['E
VENDEE-Plaintiff purchased at a retail shop some perfume manufactured by
defendant. Plaintiff suffered a second-degree burn when she applied the perfume
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to her skin, and brought suit against the manufacturer. _The lower court entered
a judgment for the defendant after the jury had brought in a verdict for the
plaintiff. Held, reversed, and lower court orclered to render its judgment in
favor of plaintiff upon verdict returned by jury; the manufacturer was liable for
negligence to the plaintiff even though there was no privity of contract between
them. Carter v. Yardley & Co., Limited, (Mass. 1946) 64 N.E. (2d) 693.
The decision fo the principal case, bringing Massachusetts into line with the _
ever-increasing number of jurisdictions following the rule laid down in McPherson v. Buick M(!tor Car Co.,1 would appear to have the effect of extending
a manufacturer's liability for negligence to remote third persons. The McPherson rule has been construed so liberally that there is practically no limit to what
will be held tg be an ''imminently dangerous" 2 article in future litigation. Although the rule originally covered articles8 which would be likely to cause serious
injury if negligently manufactured, it has since been applied in cases involving
such articles as coffee urns 4 and woolen underwear. 5 It is to be noted that the
Massachusetts court, which had refused to adopt the McPherson rule for thirty
years,6 has changed its views and has applied the rule in a situation where individual allergy might be a most important factpr in an alleged injury.7 However, the
tendency has been to whittle away the manufacturer's immunity to negligence
actions by remote vendees, and it appears that the general rule that a manufacturer of an article is not liable for negligence jn its manufacture to a third person
with whom he has no contractual relations s may soon be an exception 9 to a
rule that the manufacturer is liable to remote vendees for such negligence.
'
Wiljiam H. Buchanan, S.Ed.

1 217 N.Y. 382, III N.E. 1050 (191&) (where an article, if negligently.manufactured, is likely to cause injury to remote vendees, the manufacturer is liable to a
remote vendee injurecl as a result of the collapse of the defective article).
2 That is, one which will" be unreasonably dangerous if negligently made.
8 In the McPherson case, ibid., the article was a defective automobile wheel.
4 Hoenig v. Central Stamping Co., 247 App. Div. 895, 287 N.Y.S. II8 (1936).
5 Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills, Inc., [ 193 6] A.C. 8 5. In this case the defendant manufacturer testified that he had treated, by a certain chemical process, some4,737,600 garments, and the complaint by the plaintiff was the only one he had received. See 105 A.L.R. 1502 (1936).
6 " • • • the case nevertheless falls within the class of cases which hold that a manufacturer of an article is not liable for negligence in its manufacture to a third person with
whom be has no contractual relation; ... and is not within any exceptions to the general rule which is recognized in this Commonwealth." Christensen v. Bremer, 263
Mass.• 129, 136, 160 N.E. 410 (1928). In that case the defendant built machinery
for use in a gravel pit. The supporting posts of part of the ma~hinery collapsed and the
machinery fell and killed a person standing beneath_it.
7 In the principal case the plaintiff was careful to prepare for such an objection by
having !hree witnesses apply the perfume to their skin and having them testify that
they suffered injury as a result. See principal case at-694.
s 45 C.'J., Negligence, § 326, p. 887.
9 "The time has come for us to recognize that that asserted general rule no longer
exists. In principle it was unsound. It tended to produce unjust results... .- We now
abandon it in this Commonwealth." Principal case at 700.

